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LAND CONDEMNATION-FEDERAL INCOME
TAX CONSEQUENCES
Keith Mller*
In the following article, the author examines an oft-forgotten
phase of condemnation-the Federal income tax consequences
which the condemnee-landowner must face after receiving com-
pensation from the condemner. The author takes the reader
through the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, examining the problems of "gain or loss", "severance dam-
ages", etc. He emphasizes that the attorney for the condemnee
must consider this problem if he is to adequately advise a con-
demnee-client.
The Editors
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE
A tax-wise landowner may realize more net proceeds from
the condemnation of his land than one who is not well advised.
Varying federal tax consequences, often depending upon form or
upon technicalities, behoove a landowner to consult his lawyer
even in advance of negotiation for voluntary sale of his land to
the state.
Generally speaking, it makes no difference tax-wise whether
one voluntarily sells and deeds his land to the government, or
whether his land is taken by the government under statutory
condemnation procedure. Thus, for purposes of the following
discussion, property "condemned" includes property voluntarily
sold under threat or imminence of condemnation. Either transac-
tion is an "involuntary conversion" of the property, within the
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1
This article is intended to deal only with tax consequences
of condemnation of real estate. The term "real estate" is intended
to include land and improvements which are affixed to the land;
it is contemplated that all real estate will fall into one of four
• B.S., 1945; LL.B., 1949, University of Colorado; Member of Omaha,
Nebraska, Colorado, and American Bar Associations; Past Chairman
of Section on Taxation, Nebraska Bar Association. Partner of the
firm of Young, Holm, and Miller, Omaha, Nebraska.
SInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1033. Hereinafter cited as Code.
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property held primarily for sale by a real estate dealer, or the
categories for tax purposes. It is either property held for pro-
ductive use in a trade or business, property held for investment,
residence of the taxpayer. The article attempts to illustrate the
tax consequences of the condemnation of each such class of real
estate.
Discussions herein concerning involuntary conversion rules
are not necessarily applicable, and should not be relied upon,
where property is converted as a result of some transaction or
event other than a condemnation or sale under threat or immi-
nence of condemnation.
II. GAIN OR LOSS
A. ELEMENTS OF NET PROCEEDS
Although a landowner may be interested only in the total
net proceeds he is paid by the condemning authority as "just
compensation," as many as four separate elements of the net pro-
ceeds may be factors in determining his income tax consequences.
These are: (1) the consideration or damages paid for the land
actually taken; (2) the consequential or severance damages to
abutting real estate retained by him; (3) the amount of special
assessments he must pay the condemning authority on account
of the improvement; and (4) his expenses incurred in connection
with the condemnation.
B. GAIN OR Loss REALIZED
A condemnation of land is a sale or exchange within the
meaning of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.2 Aside from two
statutory exceptions, gain or loss on land condemned is realized
and recognized for income tax purposes just the same as if the
land had been sold voluntarily to a purchaser other than a govern-
mental agency. The exceptions, hereinafter discussed, are found
in sections 1033 and 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
3
Gain or loss realized is always measured by the difference be-
tween the net consideration received and the adjusted basis of
the land condemned.
2 G.C.M. 23646, C.B. 1943, p. 372; Comm. v. Kieselbach, 127 F.2d 359,
29 AFTR 270 (1942).
3 § 1033 pertains to the election of the taxpayer not to recognize gain
in certain cases; § 1231 prescribes different treatment of gains and
losses on "capital assets."
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C. RECOGNITION OF LOSSES
The involuntary conversion rules deal only with non-recog-
nition of gains in certain cases, but there is no such provision
providing for non-recognition of losses. Without exception, (a)
losses on residential property may not be deducted; 4 (b) losses
on real estate held by a dealer primarily for sale are deductible
from ordinary income; (c) losses on real estate used in a trade
or business, held for six months or less, are deductible from ordi-
nary income; and (d) losses on investment real estate (capital
assets), held for six months or less, are deductible only as short-
term capital losses, subject to the limitations of section 1211 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Losses on real estate used in a trade or business, and held
for more than six months, and on investment real estate held
for more than six months, are treated as section 1231 losses. Thus,
the first exception applies to recognition of losses on capital assets
held for more than six months. Such a loss resulting from an
ordinary sale or exchange is offset against capital gains and is
subject to the limitations of section 1211; however, such a loss
resulting from condemnation will receive section 1231 treatment,
and will be fully deductible as an ordinary loss except to the extent
that it is offset against gains from other section 1231 assets. This
exception points up the necessity of wise planning on the part
of a landowner whose land is about to be condemned. If he has
other gains or losses in the current taxable year, he might find
it advantageous to stall negotiation or actual condemnation, when
possible, so that the effective date of the sale will not occur until
the next taxable year. Or, if the land to be taken is a capital
asset held for less than six months, he may find it advantageous
tax-wise to stall until the six-month holding period has expired.
D. RECOGNITION OF GAIs
All gains from property condemned, or sold under threat or
imminence of condemnation, are realized and recognized the same
as if the sale were voluntarily made to a purchaser other than
the condemning authority, except that long-term capital gains
become section 1231 gains, and except that the taxpayer may elect
not to recognize all or any part of the gain from a condemnation
by complying with section 1033 and Regulations 1.1033.
Although it is generally advantageous to the taxpayer to
receive section 1231 treatment with regard to losses on capital
4 Code, § 165(c).
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assets held for more than six months, section 1231 treatment on
gains may be disadvantageous. Assume, for example, that a cal-
endar-year taxpayer has a $1,000 loss in 1959 by reason of the
voluntary sale or exchange of a truck which he uses in his business.
In the same year, he realizes a gain of $1,000 by reason of the
condemnation of a vacant lot he had held for investment for
more than six months. He has no other gains or losses except pro-
fit from his business operation. Had he sold the lot voluntarily for
the same price, the gain would have been long-term capital gain,
subject only to the alternative tax,5 or includible in taxable in-
come only to the extent of $500, 6 whichever would produce the
lesser tax, and the loss on the truck would have been entirely
deductible from ordinary income. By treating the condemnation
gain as a section 1231 gain, however, the gain and the loss offset
each other. In the one situation, a net deductible loss of $500 is
effected voluntarily, but where condemnation occurred, no de-
duction is effective. In such situations, the taxpayer might well
find a buyer for a capital asset about to be condemned. It is
doubtful at best that a voluntary sale to the condemning authority
could be treated as a long-term capital gain rather than as a sec-
tion 1231 gain, since section 1231 clearly pertains to property
converted as a result of "condemnation or the threat or imminence
thereof".
When an entire parcel of land is taken by the condemning
authority, neither severance damages nor special assessments are
a factor in computing the gain or loss realized by the taxpayer.
When only a portion of the owner's land is taken, however, the
following rules apply:
(1) The severance damages 7 merely reduce the basis of all
the abutting land owned by the taxpayer whose land was taken,
hereinafter referred to as the "remaining land". No gain is realized
except to the extent that the severance damages exceed the basis
of the remaining land. To the extent of the gain so realized, pay-
ment of severance damages constitutes an involuntary conversion
within the meaning of section 1033. Unless the taxpayer elects
non-recognition under that section, the gain will be taxable. If the
G Code, § 1201.
6 Code, § 1202.
7 It is assumed that damages exceed special benefits to the remaining
land, and the term "severance damages" is taken to mean only the
net amount paid to the landowner on account of change in value of
the remaining land. Should special benefits exceed damages, then the
entire amount paid would constitute consideration for the land taken.
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land has been held for more than six months and is not held
primarily for sale, then the gain will receive section 1231 treat-
ment.8 Otherwise, the gain will be taxable as ordinary income. 9
(2) Only the part of the owner's "just compensation" which
constitutes consideration for the land taken will be used in deter-
mining gain or loss realized and recognized. If the evidence
clearly segregates the consideration for land taken and severance
damages, then the tax consequences with regard to the land taken
are the same as if an entire parcel was taken. 10
(3) Expenses of negotiation, appraisals, title conveyance,
and condemnation proceedings may be deducted in computing
gain or loss realized upon the taking of the land, according to
several decisions." It would seem to be reasonable and proper,
however, that such expenses should be allocated between the
sale and the acquisition of severance damages; the writer recom-
mends such an allocation where the facts and the benefit to the
taxpayer justify it. Where interest, constituting ordinary in-
come, has been paid on a condemnation award, the taxpayer has
not been allowed to deduct expenses of the condemnation against
such interest.' 2
(4) Any special assessments against remaining land on ac-
count of the improvement must be applied, first, against sever-
ance damages, and to the extent the assessments exceed sever-
ance damages, to reduce the consideration received for the land
taken. 13
s Rev. Rul. 271, C.B. 1953-2, p. 36.
9 It is doubtful that a sale or exchange occurs by reason of payment of
severance damages. Thus, where the land has been held for six months
or less, the gain qualifies neither as a § 1231 gain nor as a short-term
capital gain.
10 G.C.M. 20322, C.B. 1938-2, p. 167; G.C.M. 23698, C.B. 1943, p. 340;
I.T. 3203, C.B. 1938-2, p. 233.
11 Washington Market Co., 25 B.T.A. 576 (1932); Connally, 32 B.T.A. 920(1935); Johnson & Co. v. U.S., 33 AFTR 1472, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.
1945); Burton-Sutton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.
1945), 34 AFTR 68 (reversed on other issue), 328 U.S. 25, 34 AFTR
1017 (1945).
12 Johnson & Co. v. U.S., 33 AFTR 1472, 149 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1945).
13 Central & Pacific Imprvoement Corp. v. Commissioner, 92 F.2d 88 (9th
Cir. 1937), 20 AFTR 227 (Reversing 34 B.T.A. 208); Christian Ganahl
Co. v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1937), 19 AFTR 1114 (Re-
versing 34 B.T.A. 126); Carrano v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.
1934), 13 AFTR 976 (Reversing 33,199 P-H Memo B.T.A.). The writer
is informed that there are no instances wherein adjoining landowners
in Nebraska will be assessed for improvements in connection with the
Interstate Highway.
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Hr. EVIDENCE OF SEVERANCE DAMAGES
The Internal Revenue Service recognizes the general rule
that severance damages are applied to reduce the basis of remain-
ing property, but such application has been denied the taxpayer
where proof of the specific portion of the award representing
severance damages has been held to be insufficient The eviden-
tiary requirements thus far set up by the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice and the courts seem to be especially strict and inconsistent
with other rules of tax law, but the wise taxpayer nevertheless
should heed the rules to receive the maximum tax benefit.
Where property is sold voluntarily after negotiation, the
Internal Revenue Service will deny treatment of any part of the
award as severance damages unless the contract clearly distin-
guishes between such damages and consideration for the prop-
erty taken. In a late ruling on the subject, the Service states:
"Remuneration may be considered as having been received for
damages only where such designation has been stipulated by
both contracting parties."' 4 The leading Tax Court 15 and Circuit
Court 6 cases on the subject both involve Connecticut taxpayers.
In both cases, the State Highway Engineer testified that he con-
sidered severance damages in a fixed sum as part of the total
amount paid the taxpayer, but that such sums were not discussed
in the negotiations. In one case the state purchase voucher, and
in the other case the contract, simply showed the total payment
as the "purchase price" of the land taken. The Tax Court stated
that "a lump sum purchase price is not to be rationalized after
the event as a combination of factors which might properly have
been separately stated in the contract if the parties had seen fit
to do so."' 7
The writer finds no cases where the contract states that a
lump sum price was paid in consideration of both land taken
and consequential damages to the remaining land. It would seem
logical and reasonable, in such a case, that the taxpayer could
separate the purchase price from the severance adamages by
proving either the relative value of each, or by oral proof that
the separate amounts were mutually agreed upon. Cases are
numerous where lump sum payments, recognized by the parties
14 Rev. Rul. 54-575, C.B. 1954-2, p. 145.
15 Marshall G. Allaben, 35 B.T.A. 328.
16 Lapham v. U.S., 178 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1945), 38 AFTR 1255.
17 Supra, note 15.
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as consideration for more than one asset, have been allocated
among the assets acquired, as, for example, in transactions where
all assets and the good will of a going business have been sold
for a lump sum price.
One form of right-of-way contract used by the Nebraska De-
partment of Roads provides five separate lines on which various
elements of consideration are to be stated. Where such a form
is used, only the stated purchase price for the acreage taken
should be considered in determining gain or loss realized on the
taking of the land; however, the taxpayer should insist on a
clear-cut statement in the contract describing the other elements
of the total proceeds.
Some Nebraska taxpayers presently are being affected by
condemnation of land along the Missouri River by the Federal
Bureau of Reclamation. The form of contract used by that Bu-
reau, and possibly by other federal agencies, does not provide
for itemization of the total consideration. In cases already pro-
cessed by the office of the District Director of Internal Revenue
in Nebraska, the entire payment has been treated as considera-
tion for the land taken, even where the government engineers
and negotiators had agreed orally with the taxpayer as to the
amount of severance damages.
When there is no voluntary sale by a landowner, then the
award determined in the condemnation proceedings will be con-
clusive as to the treatment of severance damages. When a New
York court entered judgment in a condemnation proceeding,
separately stating the amount awarded for land taken and the
amount awarded for consequential damages to remaining land
and improvements, the Tax Court recognized the latter as sever-
ance damages.' 8 Conversely, should the Court's award be stated
as a lump sum, then the taxpayer will meet resistance from the
Internal Revenue Service if he attempts to treat any part of the
total award as severance damages.
In Nebraska condemnations, the condemnee's initial forum is
the county court, the award being determined by appointed ap-
praisers. The statute requires only that they ". . . shall assess
the damages that the condemnee has sustained or will sustain by
the appropriation of the property . . ."9 Under this statute, it
is doubtful that the appraisers could be forced to separate a
18 Pioneer Real Estate Company, 47 B.T.A. 886.
19 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 76-710 (Reissue 1958).
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condemnation award into two sums, one for land taken and the
other for severance damages. The condemnee's only apparent
hope of tax relief is a prayer based on sympathy that the county
judge will instruct the appraisers to state the severance damages
separately. Should the appraisers make only a lump sum award,
then tax consequences might dictate an appeal to the district
court, even if the total amount of the award is sufficient.
The Iowa Legislature solved a similar dilemma by amending
its eminent domain statute. The statute now directs the condem-
nation "commissioners" to divide the damages into the value of
the land and improvements being condemned and the conse-
quential damages, when requested by the condemnee.20  Similar
legislation is recommended to the Nebraska Legislature.
Once a Nebraska condemnation proceeding is appealed to the
district court, the condemnee should request that the jury or
court render separate verdicts or findings with regard to the two
elements of the total award. The form of verdict rendered in
Schulz v. Central Nebraska P. P. & I. Dist.,21 listing separate
damages for land taken and for consequential damages to re-
maining land, certainly should be satisfactory from a tax stand-
point. However, a special verdict or finding is not a matter of
right to a litigant,22 and specific legislation certainly should be
considered.
IV. NON-RECOGNITION OF GAIN
A condemnation or a sale under threat or imminence of
condemnation is an "involuntary conversion" within the special
meaning of that term in the Internal Revenue Code.23 Recogniz-
ing the inequity of forcing a taxpayer to pay tax on a gain real-
ized only under compulsion, Congress provided relief by allow-
ing the taxpayer to escape tax on the gain from condemned prop-
erty where the proceeds are used to replace the property taken.
The rules were liberalized to take effect as of January 1, 195124
and broadened to include residential property as of January 1,
1954.25 The relief provisions were further broadened with regard
20 Iowa Code, § 472.14.
21 138 Neb. 529, 293 N.W. 409 (1940).
22 Neb. Rev. Stat., § 25-1121 (Reissue 1956).
23 Code, § 1033.
24 Section 112(f), Internal Revenue Code of 1939; 65 Stat. 733 (1951).
2G Code, § 1033(b).
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to dispositions occuring after December 31, 1957, with regard to
the nature of replacement property and with regard to treatment
of gain on condemnation of a residence.26
A. ExTENT OF NON-RECOGNITION
The taxpayer may elect not to recognize gain realized from
condemned real estate if the proceeds received for the land taken
are reinvested in the requisite "replacement property," within
specified time limits. If the entire proceeds are reinvested, no
gain need be recognized; if only a portion of the proceeds are re-
invested, then the gain must be recognized to the extent that
such proceeds are not reinvested.
Under rules effective after December 31, 1950, it is not ne-
cessary to trace specific funds into the replacement property, the
only factor being the amount of money invested in the replace-
ment property.
Assume, for example, that a strip of a taxpayer's unimproved
farm is condemned. He owns forty acres, having a basis of $20,000,
of which ten acres having a basis of $5,000 is taken. He receives
an award of $30,000 for the ten acres, plus $4,000 damages to the
remaining land. He has realized a gain in the amount of $25,000
on the ten acres, and the basis of the remaining thirty acres is
reduced to $11,000. If he elects nonrecognition of gain and pur-
chases other farm land costing at least $30,000, then he need not
recognize nor pay tax on any gain. If the other farm costs him
only $22,000, then he must recognize and pay tax on $8,000, that
portion of the proceeds of the converted land not reinvested.
B. TnvE FACTORS
Contrary to the usual real estate sale, both title to and pos-
session of condemned property may, and often do, pass to the
condemnor without any voluntary act of the condemnee. In such
situations, it is probable that the condemnee taxpayer will not
receive any proceeds from the condemnation until some later
time. Both the date of passing title and the date of receipt of
proceeds may be extremely important in tax planning.
The date that the condemning authority is vested with title
and possession is normally the effective date of condemnation
and thus of "disposition." Disposition of the property is the key
event which determines which law is applicable, i.e., pre-1951,
26 Regulations 1.1033.
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post-1950, 1954 Internal Revenue Code, or the 1958 amendments.
Disposition is also the effective act which terminates one's hold-
ing period, for purposes of determining whether the transaction
results in a short-term or long-term gain or loss. 2 7
For example, if a Nebraska taxpayer purchased land on July
1, 1950 and condemnation proceedings were commenced in Octo-
ber, 1950, resulting in the deposit with the county court on De-
cember 1, 1950 of the appraiser's award, the pre-1951 law would
apply, and the resulting gain or loss would be short-term because
the property would have been "held" for only five months. These
results would follow even though the proceedings were appealed
both to the district court and the Nebraska Supreme Court, and
even though no gain or loss were realized until 1958, when the
awarded damages finally became payable to the taxpayer.
No gain or loss is realized until such time as an accrual basis
condemnee becomes entitled to awarded damages, by reason of
the damages becoming fixed.28 Under Nebraska statutes, this
would be the date following the last day for appeal of an award,
since no part of an award becomes certain until neither party
may appeal.2 9
A cash basis taxpayer realizes gain or loss at such time as
the condemnation award actually is paid to him, where the en-
tire sum becomes payable at one time, as under the Nebraska
statute.30 Assume that a Nebraska taxpayer's land is condemned
through statutory procedure in the county court and the last day
for appeal is December 30, 1958; that no appeal is taken, and the
award is paid to the taxpayer on January 2, 1959. If the tax-
payer's taxable year ends December 31, he realizes gain or loss in
1958 if he files on an accrual basis, or in 1959 if he is a cash basis
taxpayer.
Under some stattitory condemnation procedures, a minimum
award becomes fixed and certain even though the condemnee
taxpayer may appeal in the hope of obtaining a greater award.
If such an award exceeds the taxpayer's basis for the property
taken, gain is realized by an accrual basis taxpayer when the
27 Comm. v. Kieselbach, 127 F.2d 359, 29 AFTR 270 (1942).
28 Koppers Co. v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 62; affirmed on this issue, 151
F.2d 267, 34 AFTR 151 (1945).
29 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-719 (Reissue 1958).
30 Keneipp v. U.S., 184 F.2d 263, 39 AFTR 1039 (1950).
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award of such minimum amount is paid into the court,31 or by a
cash basis taxpayer when such amount is paid to him.
32
C. AcQuiSrrloN OF REPLACEENT PROPERTY
In order that a taxpayer may avoid recognition of gain, he
must reinvest the proceeds of property taken in replacement
property within specific time limits, if the disposition occurred
after 1950. The replacement property may have been purchased
prior to disposition, but not sooner than the earliest date of threat
or imminence of condemnation. There seems to be no helpful au-
thority for determining the precise time when "threat or immi-
nence" first occurs, but it is suggested that the taxpayer have
some official notice in writing that his property is about to be
condemned prior to the time of buying replacement property.
The last date that the replacement property may be acquired is
one year after the last day of the taxable year in which any part
of the gain is first realized, provided, that the District Director of
Internal Revenue for the district in which the taxpayer files his
return may extend the time within which such property may be
acquired. The application of the taxpayer should be filed prior
to the stated deadline for replacement, showing reasonable cause
for failure to acquire replacement property prior to the dead-
line,33 but even a delinquent application may be granted if the
delinquency was due to reasonable cause.34
With regard to dispositions occuring prior to 1951, replace-
ment property had to be acquired "forthwith"3 ; - construed as
meaning "within a reasonable time" -and could not be acquired
prior to receipt of the proceeds of the conversion 30 since it was
necessary to trace the specific funds into the replacement prop-
erty.37
31 Supra, note 28.
32 Nitterhouse v. U.S., 207 F.2d 618, 44 AFTR 527 (1953); Cert. denied,
347 U.S. 943 (1954).
33 Code, § 1033(a)(3)(B); Regulations 1.1033(a)-2(c)(3).
34 Rev. Rul. 56-543, C.B. 1956-2, p. 521.
35 Winter Realty & Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 567, 33
AFTR 1411 1945, affirming 2 T.C. 38; George Herder Estate, 106 F.2d
153, 23 AFTR 322 (1939), affirming 36 B.T.A. 934.
36 Twinboro Corp. v. Commissioner, 149 F.2d 574, 33 AFTR 1418 (1945);
Cameron Machine Co., 24 T.C. 394; I.T. 3827, C.B. 1946-2, p. 57.
37 Commissioner v. Flushingside Realty Co., 149 F.2d 572, 33 AFTR 1416
(1945); Frischkorn Development Co., 88 F.2d 1009, 19 AFTR 244 (1937),
affirming 30 B.T.A. 8.
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D. NATURE OF REPLACEMENT PROPERTY
In order to elect nonrecognition of gain on condemned real
estate, the replacement property purchased must be "similar or
related in service or use"3 8 to the property condemned, except
for dispositions of business or investment real estate occurring
after 1957, in which event the replacement property must be "of
a like kind"3 9 as the property condemned.
The phrase "similar or related in service or use" has been
construed quite nairowly, thus greatly restricting the benefit in-
tended by the involuntary conversion rules. It has been held
that improved property is not similar or related in use to unim-
proved property, and vice versa.40 Property which was used in
a trade or business is not similar to property held for rent,41 and
property held for rental and used by the tenant for a specific
purpose has been held not similar to replacement property held
for rental, but used by the tenant for a different purpose. 42 Thus
in order to assure himself of non-recognition of gain on proprety
condemned prior to 1958, the taxpayer must be careful to acquire
replacement property which is held and used in the same manner
as the property condemned.
Where a strip of farm land was condemned and the owner
used the proceeds to make capital improvements on the remain-
ing portion of the farm, such as fences, sheds, trees, and wells,
the proceeds were held to be invested in property similar and re-
lated in service or use.43  Even though severance damages are
paid specifically because such .improvements will be necessary,
the taxpayer may elect non-recognition of gain on the property
taken if the severance damages so invested exceed the damages
paid for the land taken.
The 1958 amendment 44 to the statute was intended to give
the same benefit to a taxpayer with regard to condemned prop-
erty as he might have received had he voluntarily exchanged the
condemned property for other property of a "like kind." The
38 Code, §§ 1033(a)(2) and 1033(a)(3); Regulations 1.1033(a)-2.
39 Code, § 1033 (g), added by § 46(a), Technical Amendments Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 1641.
410 I.T. 1617, C.B. June, 1923, p. 119; Regulations 1.1033(a)-3(g).
41 Collins, 29 T.C. 670.
42 Rev. Rul. 56-347, C.B. 1956-2, p. 517; Steuart Bros, Inc., 29 T.C. 372.
43 Rev. Rul. 53-271, C.B. 1953-2, p. 36.
44 Code, § 1033(g).
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liberalized rule applies only to property held for use in business
or for investment, and, thus, is inapplicable to the taxpayer's
residence or to property held for sale by a real estate dealer.45
The old property and the new property are of a like kind if held
either for productive use in business or for investment, and it is
immaterial whether the real estate is improved or unimproved.
Thus, proceeds of condemned farm or ranch land may be in-
vested in city rental real estate, or in real estate to be used in a
trade or business. A leasehold interest in real estate having at
least thirty years to run is deemed to be an interest in real es-
tate, and may be replaced by a fee simple interest in real estate,
or vice versa.46
E. REPLACEMENT THROUGH CORPORATE CONTROL
The condemnee is deemed to have acquired replacement
property if he acquires at least eighty per centum of the total
combined voting power of all classes of voting stock and at least
eighty per centum of all other classes of stock of a corporation,
and if the corporation owns the requisite replacement property. 47
This special provision does not apply, however, to "like kind" re-
placements. 48 Thus, the replacement property owned by the cor-
poration, stock of which is acquired by the condemnee, must be
similar or related in service or use to the condemned property.
A question apparently never litigated is whether the other
assets of the corporation, stock of which is acquired, have any
bearing on whether or not the condemned property has been
properly replaced. Assume, for example, that a strip of farm
land is condemned and the condemnee receives $200,000 for the
land taken. If he then buys control of a corporation for $200,000,
the statute is literally complied with if the corporation also owns
farm land. However, if the corporate assets consist of a farm
worth $10,000 and other assets worth $190,000, it seems logical
that only $10,000 of the condemnation proceeds could be treated
as having been used to acquire replacement property.
45 Code, § 1031; Regulations 1.1031; S. Rep. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
72 and 202 (1958).
46 Regulations 1.1031(a)-l(b) and 1.1031(a)-1(c).
47 Code, §§ 1033(a)(3)(A) and 1033(a)(2), as amended by 72 Stat. 1641,
§ 45 (1958).
48 Code, § 1033(g)(2)(A)
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F. BASIS AND HOLDING PERIOD OF REPLACEMENT PROPERTY
The basis of replacement property is its cost, decreased by
the amount of any gain realized but not recognized upon the
condemned property. It appears that the same result will obtain
whether the condemnation of the old property occurred before or
after January 1, 1951, but the statutory formula is stated differ-
ently with regard to pre-1951 dispositions. The statute requires
using the basis of the condemned property, adding thereto the
gain recognized upon the conversion, and subtracting therefrom
the portion of the net proceeds of the conversion not expended
in acquiring the replacement property.49
It seems that the change in statutory language was intended
only as a simplification, but it poses a definite problem with re-
gard to the holding period of the replacement property. Under
the pre-1951 rule, the replacement property clearly takes the
basis of the old property, with adjustments. Under the basis rule
applying to dispositions after 1950, the replacement property
clearly takes a new basis- its cost, with adjustments. The re-
sult is that the holding period of property acquired to replace
property condemned prior to 1951 begins with the date of acqui-
sition of the condemned property, but the holding period of prop-
erty condemned acquired to replace property condemned after
1950 begins with the date of acquisition of the replacement prop-
erty.30
Assume, for example, that a Nebraska farm owner became
advised in June, 1950, that a portion of his farm was about to be
taken for a new highway. Had he sold the strip of land -at a gain
voluntarily, after negotiation, on December 31, 1950, and rein-
vested the total proceeds in farm land on January 1, 1951, the
holding period of the new land would have commenced with the
date of acquisition of the old farm. On the other hand, had the
land been condemned through statutory procedure, and had the
title and right to possession not become effective until after
December 31, 1950, then the holding period of the replacement
property, whether acquired before or after December 31, 1950,
would have commenced with the date of acquisition.
49 Code, § 1033(c); Regulations 1.1033(c):-i.
5O Code, § 1223(1); Regulations 1.1223(1)(a).
FEDERAL INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES
V. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS
A. CONDEMNATION OF RESIDENCE
Tax consequences of condemnation of a residence may vary
considerably depending upon the date of disposition, as the Con-
gress has continually attempted to alleviate hardship on a tax-
payer whose residence is involuntarily taken. Whether sold vol-
untarily, or sold under threat of condemnation, or actually con-
demned, the sale or disposition of a residence will result either in
a non-deductible loss, or in a capital gain. Any gain from a
condemnation sale or award, however, will receive section 1231
treatment, taxed as capital gain only to the extent it exceeds
section 1231 losses, if the residence had been held for more than
six months.
With regard to the disposition of a residence prior to 1951,
the taxpayer could elect non-recognition of gain only if the res-
idence was involuntarily converted, and if the replacement res-
idence was acquired pursuant to the strict pre-1951 rules.5 ' Effec-
tive January 1, 1951, Congress adopted specific legislation to pro-
vide for non-recognition of gain on any sale or disposition of a
residence, including condemnations.5 2 The rules provided sub-
stantially the same relief with regard to a residence as was effec-
tive with regard to involuntary conversions of other property.
This statute was re-enacted in 1954;r, except that condemnations
and other involvuntary conversions occurring after December 31,
1953, were excluded from the operation of the section.5 4
Condemnations of residences occurring in the years 1954
through 1957, inclusive, were involuntary conversions, and gain
thereon was subject to non-recognition under the rules effective
for condemnations of other real estate at such time.5  Final lib-
eralization of the statute came with the Technical Amendments
Act of 1958. Effective with regard to condemnation of a residence
occurring after December 31, 1957, the taxpayer may elect non-
recognition of gain by complying with the replacement require-
ments of either the specific statute dealing with sale of a res-
idence or the involuntary conversion statute. 6
51 Internal Revenue Code of 1939, § 112(f)(2)
52 Id., § 112(n).
53 Code, § 1034.
54 Code, § 1034(i).
55 Code, § 1033(b)
56 Code, § 1034(i)(2).
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B. METHOD OF ELECTING NON-RECOGNITIOIN OF GAIN57
The Commissioner requires that full details of any condem-
nation be reported on the taxpayer's income tax return filed for
the fiscal year in which any gain is realized. Such return should
set out a computation of gain realized, but should not include
such gain in gross income to the extent that non-recognition is
elected. It is suggested that a positive statement be made on
the return to the effect the taxpayer is making his election un-
der section 1033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, even though
the regulations specifically state that a failure to include any
such gain in gross income will be deemed to be an election.
If the taxpayer includes gain from condemned property in
gross income on his return for the taxable year in which gain
was incurred, he may later file either an amended return or a
refund claim, making the election at such time, if the statute of
limitations has not run.
If the taxpayer shall have elected non-recognition, but failed
to acquire replacement property within the requisite time, he is
required to file an amended return and pay the additional tax on
the gain. In any event, complete details of acquisition of replace-
ment property must be reported to the District Director of Internal
Revenue by separate notice or on the taxpayer's return filed for
the taxable year in which any such property is acquired, whether
or not any gain from the condemnation was realized in that year.
Where residential property is condemned in 1958 or there-
after, the taxpayer must carefully decide whether he wishes to
elect non-recognition of gain under the sale of residence statute58
or under the involuntary conversion statute.59 Although present
regulations do not so specify, obviously the taxpayer should clearly
state his election on the return filed for the year in which gain
is first realized.
C. EFFECT ON STATUTE OF LImITATIONS6 °
The Commissioner normally may assess an income tax de-
ficiency within three years after the due date or date of actual
57 Regulations 1.1033(a)-2(c)(2).
Gs Regulations 1.033(a)(2(c)(5) and 1.1033(a)(2)(c)(6).
59 Code, § 1034.
0o Code, § 1033.
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filing of an income tax return, whichever is later. An election
under section 1033 automatically extends the statute, and the
period of limitation becomes three years after the date the tax-
payer first notifies the District Director of Internal Revenue of
the details of acquisition of the replacement property, or of tax-
payer's intention not to replace the converted property, or of tax-
payer's failure to replace the converted property. In addition,
where the condemnation or other involuntary conversion results
in realization of gain in more than one taxable year, which is not
likely under Nebraska statutes, a deficiency for any such year
may be assessed within the period of limitations which applies
to the last such year.
The extension of the period of the statute of limitations only
allows the Commissioner to assess any deficiency arising out of
gain incurred upon the conversion with regard to which non-
recognition of gain has been elected, and the normal periods of
limitations will apply to a deficiency assessed by reason of any
other transaction.
The requisite notice with regard to replacement property
obviously should be in writing; it may be filed with taxpayer's
regular income tax return, or may be a separate instrument or
letter. The notice must be filed with the District Director for
the same district in which the return or returns, on which non-
recognition was elected, were filed.
D. INTEREST ON CONDEMNATION PROCEEDS
Nebraska statute expressly provides for the payment of in-
terest to a condemnee in cases where the condemnation award
is appealed and the award is increased in the appeal proceedings.
Interest is paid on the total award at six per cent per annum
from the date of deposit of the original award with the county
judge. 1' Any such interest paid is taxable as ordinary income
to the condemnee,6 2 and has no effect on gain realized or recog-
nized under rules hereinabove discussed.
61 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 76-711 (Reissue 1958).
62 Kieselbach v. Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399, 87 L.Ed 358 (1943), over-
ruling Seaside Improvement Co. v. Commissioner, 105 F.2d 990, 23
AFTR 293 (1939).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Interstate highway condemnations within the next few years
will present a definite opportunity for the alert lawyer to save
his client tax dollars by proper planning. The amount of the
award, the timing of the disposition, the allocation of the award
between "consideration" and "severance damages" and the pos-
sibility, practicability and timing of reinvestment of proceeds, all
may be important factors in advising a client.
Serious consideration should be given to amendment of Ne-
braska eminent domain statutes in order that Nebraska landowners
may be assured maximum benefit of special rules pertaining to
federal taxation of gain incurred by reason of condemnation. Be-
fore such amendments are adopted, however, special care must be
taken to assure the preservation of the landowner's right to just
compensation.
